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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





LARRY VALE POTTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by complaint and information 
with one count of aggravated robbery, a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended; one count of 
failure to stop at the command of a police officer, a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169.10, as repealed, 
1978; and one count of aggravated assault, a violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITIOH IN THE LmiER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury before the Honorable 
Boyd Bunnell in the Seventh Judicial District Court for 
Carbon County and found guilty of aggravated robbery and 
failure to stop at the command of a police officer on 
November 22, 1978. 
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Following a presentence investigation and report 
appellant was sentenced to a term of 5 years to life in 
the Utah State Prison with a fine of $2,000. Execution of 
the prison sentence and payment of $1,500 of the fine.were 
I 
suspended for 5 years and appellant was placed on probation. 1 
Appellant's probation was revoked on May 23, 1979, I 
and he was ordered committed to the Utah State Prison. Upor.' 
I 
filing a Notice of Appeal and a Certificate of Probable I 
Cause signed by the Honorable J. Frank i\Tilkins of this 
Court, appellant was allowed to remain free on bond pending 
the decision of this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT OH APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict and 
sentence of the lower court as well as affirmance of the 
action of that court in revoking appellant's probation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 22, 1978, Von Hayne Johnston and his 
wife responded to a knock at _their door in i\Tellington, utah, 1 
at 1:30 a.m. (T. at 3,17). 1 Upon opening the door, Mr. 
. I 
Johnston confronted appellant who stood with a cocked pis:o. 
I 
at his side (T. at 6). Appellant stated, "I want in. Let 
me in," and then followed Mr. Johnston into his house. 
1 T. refers to the transcript of the trial held November 
21 and 22, 1978. R. refers to the record on appeal. 
H. refers to the transcript of the hear:..ng to show ca'JSc 
why probation should not be revoked held !1ay 23, 197 9. 
-2-
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When they reached the kitchen, appellant said, "I want 
a roll of toilet paper and some matches." Mr. Johnston 
got some matches out of a kitchen cabinet and his wife 
retrieved a roll of toilet paper from the bathroom 
(T. at 4,17-18). The items were placed in appellant's 
hat and Mrs. Johnston was told that she was no longer 
needed (T. at 4). She went to the sewing room where, 
because of on-going remodeling, she could see into the 
living room and observed her husband and appellant as 
they went out the front door (T. at 18). On the front 
porch, the roll of toilet paper fell out of appellant's 
hat and appellant got "kind of nervous" (T. at 4). Mr. 
Johnston put his hands on the door while appellant 
picked up the roll (T. at 5 and 18). Appellant then said 
"thank you,"shook Mr. Johnston's hand, got in his car and 
drove away at a very rapid pace (T. at 5 and 13). Mrs. 
Johnston then called the highway patrol (T. at 18). 
Mr. Johnston noted that he thought appellant 
might well shoot him or his wife. He stated that appellant 
walked and talked normally and did not sway or lean 
against the wall. He said appellant drove normally except 
that he accelerated very quickly (T. at 12-13). He did 
not think appellant was drunk (T. at 16). 
Mrs. Johnston testified that although appellant 
had seemed in a daze, with a blank expression, he had 
-3-
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walked normally and that his eyes and demeanor had 
seemed about the same at the preliminary hearing 
(T. at 19,20). She had seen appellant at a bank some 
time after the incident and immediately noticed that his 
voice sounded the same, which frightened her at that 
time considerably (T. at 20-21). She stated that she 
thought something was wrong with appellant largely 
because of what he asked for and that her analysis of 
appellant's mental state would have changed if he had 
asked for a large sum of money (T.at 26 and 28). She 
could not smell any alcohol about his person (T. at 27). 
Officer Larry Prince of the East Carbon City 
Police DepartQent, after having been notified by the 
Price dispatcher, spotted appellant and gave chase 
(T. at 30). With both his overhead lights and siren 
on, he reached a speed of 110 miles per hour as he 
followed appellant toward Green River, Utah (T. at 30). 
Eventually appellant's car stopped and appellant stood 
in the middle of the road with a gun in his hand (T. at 
48). Officer Prince kept his distance and waited for 
other officers to arrive (T. at 31-32). 
As Officer Larry Penrod of the Price City PolicE 
Department sped past Officer Prince, appellant got into 
his car and turned back towards Price (T. at 48). After 
-4-
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very nearly having a head-on collision with another Price 
City police car driven by Officer Vuksinik (T. at 32,48 
and 57), appellant continued towards Price with all three 
police cars in pursuit with lights and sirens on (T. at 
49). Officer Prince described the chase: 
On occasions we reached speeds up to 
70 or more miles an hour. Several times 
the subject slammed on his brakes, trying 
to disable Officer Penrod's car--tailgate 
him. He stopped several other times. We 
tried to talk him out of the car and he 
would proceed. He would not get out of the car. 
Finally, we passed the Horse Canyon Hine Junction 
and headed toward Columbia. Several other times 
he slammed on his brakes. At one time he 
motioned at Officer Penrod to come up alongside. 
So Officer Penrod went up--to pull up to try 
and get in front of him so we could stop the 
vehicle. 
Q. How did he motion? 
A. With his left arm. I couldn't really 
tell exactly what he was doing. I could see a 
hand, maybe, you know, sticking out. So 
Penrod pulled up alongside of the car and at 
that time I saw the suspect vehicle swerve to 
the left, hitting Officer Penrod's right front. 
He went off to the left in the barrow pit and 
back in to the road, almost lost control of his 
vehicle. A little bit later his vehicle stopped 
again and we tried talking him out. And he went 
to get out of the car but then he took off again. 
Several times this happened. 
(T. at 33-34). 
Officer Prince stated further that "every time 
Officer Penrod would try to pull alongside, he would control 
his car enough to block off the lane of travel. He was 
using his r.1irrors. He had full control of his car." 
-5-
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(T. at 46, see also T. at 49). His driving was not 
characteristic of someone who was under the influence 
of alcohol, according to Officer Prince (T. at 46). 
Officer Penrod added that " ... while going 
around one of the curves, I observed the suspect reach 
back towards us with a hand gun, and I observed a flash 
from the weapon," (T. at 49). He stated that appellant 
was not a candidate for a charge of driving under the 
influence and that he had good control of his car (T. 
at 55). Returning to Officer Prince's narration: 
[F]inally there was a big 
cloud of smoke--dark blue smoke, and he 
stopped his vehicle. We had a roadblock 
about ~mile up on the road. And at that 
time I thought that maybe he was stopping 
for the roadblock. . . . 
Officer Penrod exited his car, using 
his door as cover. I positioned my car to 
the left rear of Officer Penrod's car. 
I exited my car using my door as cover. 
we ordered the subject out of the car, 
which he did. And he was standing there 
with the--a weapon in his hand, waving it 
with the barrel down. And Officer Penrod 
told him several times to put it down. 
And at one time he said: "Put the gun down 
and don't do anything stupid." And finally 
he did put the gun down. Officer Penrod 
and Sheriff Passic came up and subdued the 
subject. And I came up and I grabbed the 
weapon at that time. 
(T. at 34). 
Despite the fact that a blood test given at 
3:00 a.m. indicated a blood-alcohol content of .24 (T. at 
-6-
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42 and 44), all of the officers noted that appellant 
walked and talked normally (T. at 39,53, and 60). 
Officer Prince stated that his movement and speech 
were not characteristic of one who was under the 
influence of alcohol (T. at 46). He could not smell 
alcohol and did not suspect that this was a case of 
driving under the influence of alcohol (T. at 42, 44). 
Officer Prince said that, given the excitement of the 
chase appellant seemed fairly normal (T. at 39). Officer 
Penrod's testimony paralleled that of Officer Prince and 
he also noted that appellant acted normally and was 
not a candidate for a driving under the influence charge 
(T. at 53-54). Officer Vuksinik, who knew appellant as 
a bartender at the Elk's Club and had seen him quite often, 
noted that appellant's speech was normal and that he 
"carried himself fine." (T. at 60). Officer Vuksinik did 
not feel that a driving under the influence charge would 
have been appropriate (T. at 59). 
After appellant had been placed into a police 
car, he overheard Officer Vuksinik commenting about 
running out of gas. He said, "what's the matter, Vuksinik? 
Did you run out of gas?" He then laughed (T. at 54 and 59). 
In his own defense, appellant testified that 
he had been hit on the head with a small bat in 1974 
-7-
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which had left a scar on the left side of his head (T. 
at 68). He said that he had been taking medication 
for gout every day and had been drinking a blended 
whiskey after work on February 21, 1978 (T. at 69). 
He noted that he was drinking what he always drank 
(~. at 69-70). Although he had had that medication 
and liquor before at the same time, he clained to 
have never had problems before (T. at 78-79). He 
stated that he remembered drinking about five drinks 
until about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. and nothing thereafter 
until he awakened in jail (T. at 70-71). 
Dr. Lincoln Clark, a psychiatrist, testified 
at length about the potential effects of the scar on 
appellant'shead, the drinks, and the medication. He 
hypothesized that appellant was experiencing a seizure 
which left him in a dream-like state, able to walk and 
talk normally but not able to consciously direct his 
actions (T. at 92). Dr. Clark did note that his opinion 
was not conclusive or the only possible explanation for 
appellant's actions. He said: 
I'm simply trying to make sense 
out of-what, to me, was a very puzzling 
event in this man's life, as to why this 
thing happened; and to try and determine 
what it was related to. 
(T. at 105). 
-8-
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Dick Foster testified for the state in rebuttal 
that he had met with appellant in the evening of February 
21st and that appellant, Mr. Foster and his wife had 
been drinking beer and tequila (T. at 115), but that 
he did not believe appellant was intoxicated (T. at 113). 
Mr. Foster said that appellant had been "coming on" to 
his wife all evening and that he took them to his house 
to "see his puppies," (T. at 113). When Mr. Foster 
refused to go into appellant's house, appellant said 
"okay" and ran in by himself. Mr. and Mrs. Foster, 
suspecting trouble, ran away. As they ran they heard 
appellant come back out and gun shots ·(T. at 114). Mr. 
Foster said he thought appellant's actions were strange 
in that he was acting as he was towards Mrs. Foster 
(T. at 115). 
After hearing the evidence, the jury deliberated 
and returned a verdict of guilty on the charges of 
aggravated robbery and failure to stop at the command 
of a police officer and not guilty on the charge of 
aggravated assault (R. at 60-62). Following a presentence 
investigation by the State Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole, appellant was sentenced to a term of five years 
to life in the Utah State Prison and a fine of $2,000. 
Execution of the prison sentence and payment of $1,500 of 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the fine were suspended and appellant was placed upon 
probation with the following terms: 
1. That appellant would pay the $500 fine within 
90 days: 
2. That appellant serve thirty days, on 
weekends, in the Carbon County Jail; 
3. That appellant remain in present treatment 
with Dr. Lincoln Clark and enter alcohol therapy as 
designated by Adult Probation and Parole; 
4. That appellant submit to a breathalyzer 
test at the discretion of Adult Probation and Parole 
within reasonable circumstances and hours; 
5. That appellant totally abstain from the 
use of alcoholic beverages; and 
6. That appellant pay $100.00 restitution to 
the Price City Police Department for damages to the 
patrol car. 
Appellant was also given a sentence of six 
months in the Carbon County Jail, to be served concurrently 
with the prison sentence, which was also suspended and 
probation imposed upon the same terms and conditions 
(R. at 85,86). 
On April 27, 1979, the Price City Police receivec 
a call which indicated a possible assault with a firearm 
-10-
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(H. at 28-29). Officer Larry Penrod responded and found 
Ms. Lucille Begay barefoot wearing just pajamas and a 
nightgown, standing in the driveway at 345 South 100 
East in Price (T. at 27,29). She told Officer Penrod 
that, at appellant's invitation, she was living in 
his house. She said that he had beaten her, thrown her 
out of the house, and threatened her with a gun (H. at 
29). She said that she wanted to retrieve her clothes 
and other property (H. at 2,47). 
Fearing that additional help might be needed 
because of the possibility that appellant was armed, 
several other police officers were summoned (H. at 30, 
40 and 46). The officers realized that appellant was on 
probation and summoned probation agents Troth and Reid 
(H. at 4). In an attempt to retrieve Ms. Begay's property 
(H. at 29 and 47), the officers knocked on the door of 
appellant's house and no one answered (H. at 30). Ms. 
Begay then opened the unlocked door and led them to 
appellant's bedroom (H. at 5,6,13 and 30). Agent Reid 
knocked on the locked bedroom door, identifying himself 
and asking to talk to appellant (H. at 6,30,41 and 48). 
There was no threatening language used (H. at 41). 
Suddenly, appellant opened the bedroom door and grabbed 
Agent Reid. Officer Christensen of the Carbon County 
Sheriff's Office pulled appellant off but not before he 
tore Agent Reid's shirt (H. at 6,30,42 and 49). Deputy 
-11-
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Christensen noted that there was a strong odor of 
alcohol about appellant (H. at 50). Agent Reid asked 
appellant to submit to a breathalyzer test, which he 
refused to do (H. at 8,9,31 and 50). One of the 
officers noted that appellant sounded quite upset, 
that his voice level was rising and that he was, at 
times, screaming (H. at 43). Eventually he threw a 
drawer full of Ms. Begay's clothes out into the living 
room (H. at 9 and 34). 
Appellant testified that he had put Ms. Begay 
out of the house because she had been drinking and 
acting violently (H. at 56-57). He said she was staying 
in his house while looking for a job (H. at 54-55). 
He admitted having a struggle with Agent Reid but said 
that he did so after his bedroom door had been thrown 
open and light had been shown in his face (H. at 53). 
After hearing the testimony, the Court felt that 
Ms. Begay had demonstrated enough of an interest to admit 
the officers to the house (H. at 63). The Court ruled 
that appellant had been shO\m to have viola~ed his probat,: 
by acting violently toward Agent Reid, drinking alcohol, 
and refusing to submit to a brect~halyzer examination at 
what was, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable 
time (H. at 64-66). Appellant's probation was revoked a~,: 
he was committed to theUtahState Prison (H. at 66-67). 
-12-
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ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE OF REDUCED 
CAPACITY OR INTOXICATION IS NOT 
SO OVERWHELMING AS TO COMPEL 
A REASONABLE DOUBT OF APPELLANT'S 
GUILT. 
In State in Interest of R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333 
(Utah 1979), this Court restated the rule of review with 
respect to a jury verdict challenged on the basis of 
insufficient evidence. Citing State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 
1272 (Utah 1975), the Court stated: 
It is the prerogative of the jury to 
judge the weight of the evidence, the 
credibility of the witnesses, and the 
facts to be found therefrom. For a 
defendant to prevail upon a·challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain his conviction, it must appear that 
viewing the evidence and all inferences that 
may reasonbly be drawn therefrom, in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury, reasonable minds could not believe 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To 
set aside a verdict it must appear that 
the evidence was so inconclusive or 
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting 
fairly must have entertained reasonable 
doubt that defendant committed the crime. 
Unless the evidence compels such conclusion 
as a matter of law, the verdict must be 
sustained. 
Id. at 1272. 
In this matter the only issue raised by appellant 
concerns whether or not the jury was correct in finding 
that he had the requisite intent to commit the crimes 
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. specific intent may be 
proved by circumstantial, as well as 
direct, evidence,. and that it may be 
inferred from the acts and conduct of 
the accused, the nature of the weapon 
used by defendant and manner in which 
it was used, taken together with all 
the other circumstances in the case. 
As to whether or not the specific 
intent existed in the mind of the accused 
is a question of fact to be submitted to 
and determined by the jury from all the 
evidence in the case and the inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, and is not a 
matter of legal presumption. 
State v. Minousis, 64 Utah at 206, 211-212, 228 Pac. 
574 (1924). See also State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 392 
P. 2d 486 at 488 (1964). 
Appellant contends that the presence of the 
specific intent to commit aggravated robbery was negated 
by evidence of insanity and/or intoxication. Neverthe-
less, evidence tending to demonstrate either or both of 
those defenses presented at trial does not compel a 
reasonable person to conclude that the jury was mistaken 
in finding appellant guilty of aggravated robbery. 
REDUCED CAPACITY 
Appellant raises, for the first time, the defenS' 
of insanity under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1953), as 
amended. The record is devoid of any notice, prior to 
trial, of an intent to use the insanity defense as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-16 (1953), as amended. 
Given the absence of the required notice or any discuss~: 
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of good cause for permitting evidence indicating 
insanity, it must be assumed that any evidence which 
might demonstrate insanity was presented and considered 
in connection with the defense of voluntary intoxication 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1953), as amended. This 
is especially true in this matter where the evidence of 
reduced capacity was particularly aimed at demonstrating 
the effect of alcohol and/or drugs upon appellant. It 
would be improper to consider the defense of reduced 
capacity under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1953), as 
amended, as raised at this time. To do so would defeat 
the purpose of the notice requirement of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-22-16 (1953), as amended, since the State would be 
effectively prevented from countering such a defense with 
affirmative evidence. 
Nevertheless, even if it is assumed, for the 
sake of argument, that the defense of reduced capacity 
or insanity under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 was raised 
in a timely manner and should now be considered, appellant's 
evidence on the point does not compel this Court to set 
aside the jury's determination of guilt. 
It is well settled in Utah that once evidence 
is introduced which raises the issue of the defendant's 
sanity, the presumption of sanity disappears and the 
matter of the defendant's ability to form any necessary 
-15-
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criminal intent becomes a jury question. State v. Green, 
78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d at 177 at 182 (1932). See also 
State v. Dominguez, 564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977). 
In State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 641 (190~ 
a jury verdict of guilt was reversed because it was 
apparent that the jury had disregarded overwhelming 
evidence of insanity which had been left unrebutted by 
the prosecution. The Court said: 
At the trial the defendant made no 
attempt to deny or explain the acts 
charged as constituting the offense, 
but relied solely upon the defense of 
insanity, while the state relied entirely 
upon proof of the acts charged, without 
in any way attempting to rebut or explain 
the evidence of insanity submitted on 
behalf of the defendant. 
Id. at 642. 
The Court did, however, note that: 
There, no doubt, may be instances 
where the evidence offered by the 
defendant upon the question of his sanity 
is so weak and inconclusive that the state 
may well insist upon the presumption of 
sanity, and thus need not offer any 
evidence in rebuttal of defendant's 
evidence upon the question. 
Id. at 644. 
Finally, the Court said: 
If the state of the evidence upon the 
issue of insanity had been such as to permit 
reasonable men to arrive at different 
-16-
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conclusions when considered in connection 
with the presumption of sanity, then the 
question would be one of fact merely, and 
we would be powerless to interfere. 
Id. at 646. 
In State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 234 Pac. 940 
(1925), a jury verdict of guilt in the face of evidence 
of insanity was upheld. The Court noted that the evidence 
was not so overwhelming as in earlier cases and said: 
The question of the sanity or insanity 
of any one accused of the commission of a 
crime is a question of fact primarily for 
the jury to determine. Courts should not 
set aside a jury's verdict, unless it 
appears from the whole record that the 
jury, without reason and in disregard of the 
uncontradicted testimony, rendered its 
verdict contrary to such testimony. 
Id. at 842. 
Still later, in State v. Holt, 22 Utah 2d 109, 
449 P.2d 119 (1969), the defendant claimed that a jury 
verdict of guilt should have been reversed because the 
testimony of two psychiatrists to the effect that he 
was not responsible for his actions in killing an ex-
girlfriend went unrebutted by any expert testimony. The 
court first restated State v. Hadley, supra, and then, 
citing Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 754-757 
(8th Cir. 1961), stated: 
-17-
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This and other courts have said that 
expert opinion as to insanity rises no 
higher than the reasons upon which it is 
based, that it is not binding upon the 
trier of facts, and that lay testimony can qe 
sufficient to satisfy the prosecutions' 
burden even though there is expert testimony 
to the contrary. . (citations omitted). 
There is nothing essentially sacred or 
untouchable in expert testimony. The mere 
fact that the primary evidence on one side 
may be typified as expert in character while 
that on the other is exclusively from the 
mouths of lay witnesses and from lay facts 
must not of itself serve to destroy the 
jury's traditional function. 
State v. Holt, supra, 449 P.2d at 120-121. 
The Court then cited People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 795, 394P.: 
959 at 964-965 (1964): 
In People v. Wolff, four psychiatrists 
testified that the defendant was insane; 
the court stated: 
* * * It is only in the rare case when 
"the evidence is uncontradicted and entirely 
to the effect that the accused is insance" 
[citation omitted) that a unanimity of 
expert testimony could authorize upsetting 
a jury finding to the contrary. While the 
jury may not draw inferences inconsistent 
with incontestably established ~s2ts 
[citation omitted), neverthcol.ess '_f there 
is substantial evidence fro~ wh~~. the 
jury could infer that the defendant was 
legally sane at the time of the offense 
such a finding must be sustained in the face 
of conflicting evidence, expert or otherwise, 
for the question of weighing that evidence 
and resolving that conflict "is a question 
of fact for the jury's determination" 
[citation omitted). * * * 
* * * it is settled that "the conduct 
and declarations of the defendant occurring 
within a reasonable time before or after the 
commission of the alleged act arc admissible 
in proof of his mental condition at the time cf 
the offense." * * * 
-18-
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State v. Holt, supra at 121. The Court cited further: 
. • . To hold otherwise would be in 
effect to substitute a trial by "experts" 
for a trial by jury, for it would require 
that the jurors accept th~psychiatric 
testimony as conclusive on an issue--the 
legal sanity of the defendant--which under 
our present law is exclusively within the 
province of the trier of fact to determine. 
To guard against misunderstanding of . 
our rules it is pertinent to observe that we 
do not reject expert testimony simply or 
solely because it may also answer the ultimate 
question the jury is called upon to decide 
(citation omitted); but, strictly speaking, 
a psychiatrist is not an "expert" at all 
when it comes to determining whether the 
defendant is legally responsible •• 
Id. at 122 (emphasis in original). The court then held: 
In the instant action . . . the testimony 
respecting the insanity of the appellant is 
not so positive or conclusive that it can be 
said as matter of law that the jury, in 
returning a verdict of guilty, acted 
arbitrarily or failed to give consideration 
and regard to the evidence in the case. 
Id. at 122. 
The position of this Court as stated in State v. 
Holt, supra, is consistent with the weight of authority from 
other jurisdictions. See State v. Cano, 103 Ariz. 37, 
436 P.2d 586, 590 (1968); Griswell v. State, 443 P.2d 552, 
555, 556 (Nev. 1968); Gonzales v. State, 388 P.2d 312, 317 
(Okla. Crim. 1964); United States v. Coleman, 501 F.2d 
342 at 346 (lOth Cir. 1974); United States v. Dube, 520 F.2d 
250 at 250-252 (1st Cir. 1975); and People v. Lowe, 184 
co 1. 18 2 , 519 P. 2 d 3 4 4 , 3 4 8 ( 19 7 4 ) • 
-19-
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In the instant matter there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury determination of guilt. 
Appellant's expert witness noted that his opinion was· 
not conclusive or the only possible explanation for 
appellant's actions (T. at 105). Virtually every 
person involved testified that appellant walked and 
talked normally (T. at 10,13,16,19,20,53 and 60). 
Appellant had had the scar on his head for four years 
(T. at 68). Drinking along with taking medication was 
a regular occurrence (T. at 69-70). He recognized 
Officer Vuksinik (T. at 54, 59), and was able to drive 
horne with the Fosters after drinking at several bars 
(T. at 113-115). Dr. Clark's testimony that with the 
right combination of alcohol and medication appellant 
could believe he was back in Viet Narn looking for "C" 
rations is, at best, a tentative suggestion of an 
explanation for appellant's behavior. 
Reasonable persons could certainly find that 
appellant's overall conduct was inconsistent with the 
Doctor's theory, and conclude that appellant did, indeed, 
know what he was doing. Respondent does not pretend 
that the facts in this matter are not bizarre. But the 
mere fact that appellant asked for toilet paper and 
matches instead of something of greater value does not 
-20-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compel a finding that appellant did not have the 
capacity to form larcenous intent. Appellant did not 
steal anything of great value or cause any great, 
tangible harm. He did, however, terrorize two persons 
in their own home as well as jeopardize the lives of a 
number of law enforcement personnel. Why appellant 
did what he did is not a question that can be 
answered by a court. The jury did, however, determine 
that appellant was capable of intending to do what he 
did. The evidence of Dr. Clark is not so compelling 
that the evidence from which intent and capacity may be 
inferred so weak that a reasonable person is compelled 
to determine that appellant lacked the capacity to direct 
his actions. Consequently, the verdict of the jury should 
be affirmed. 
INTOXICATION 
Appellant claims to have negated any possi-
bility of specific intent via proof of voluntary 
intoxication in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-306 (1953), as amended, which provides that voluntary 
intoxication is a defense when "such intoxication negates 
the existence of the mental state which is an element of 
the offense." Where the charge is aggravated robbery 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended, the 
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actor must unlawfully and intentionally take personal 
property from the victim. Reading the two statutes 
together, in order for a person to have a defense to 
aggravated robbery, he must be so intoxicated that 
he is unable to intend to unlawfully take property from 
another. Mere evidence which indicates some degree of 
intoxication does not, by itself, establish a defense. 
The intoxication must be to the extent that it negates 
the requisite mental state. In Rice v. State, 500 P.2d 
675 (Mont. 1972), the Court stated: 
. [T]he understanding of one 
who has been drinking must be determined 
on the facts of each particular case. 
In Rice's case, it was for the jury to 
decide whether his drinking had rendered 
him insane •. 
If the defendant is to stand on a 
claim that he, because of drunkenness, could 
not have intended the consequences of his 
acts, that fact would first have to be proven 
to the jury. . To claim insanity on account 
of drunkeness is equivalent to claiming the 
absence of intent on account of drunkeness. 
The question is clearly a jury question. 
Id. at 676, 677. 
In Griggs v. Cowmonwealth, 255 S.E.2d 475 (Va. 
1979), the defendant was charged with robbing a bank and 
claimed amnesia and a lack of intent due to a toxically 
based organic brain syndrome induced from the use of 
drugs. The Court held: 
-22-
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We believe that it was for the 
jury to decide whether the defendant 
acted with criminal intent in the 
corrunission of the crimes.- v<hile the 
Corrunonwealth may not have produced 
"concrete evidence" of intent, such 
a failure is not unusual; of 
necessity, intent often is established 
by circumstantial evidence. There 
was abundant circumstantial evidence 
before the jury from which it could 
have inferred criminal intent. 
Id. at 4 78. 
Finally, in State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 196 S.E.2d 
777, 788 (1973), it was noted that the intoxication 
required to make a person guilty of driving under the 
influence and the level of intoxication required to 
negate criminal intent was not congruent. 
In the instant matter, while there was 
evidence of intoxication, there was also evidence from 
which it could be inferred that appellant was not so 
intoxicated that he could not have intended to corrunit the 
crime of aggravated robbery. None of the police officers 
who testified felt that appellant was intoxicated (T. at 42, 
44,46,53-54,59-60). Appellant was able to walk, talk, 
and drive normally (T. at 12-13,19-20,46,49,39,53 and 60). 
He recognized acquaintances(T. at 54 and 59). His voice 
was the same on the evening in question as it was later 
at a casual setting in a bank (T. at 20-21). Mrs. 
Johnston stated that although she thought appellant had 
taken something or was on drugs, she felt that way 
-23-
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primarily because of what he asked for, not because of 
the way he acted or talked (T. at 26 and 28). The 
psychiatrist's speculative explanation was only offered 
as one possible reason for appellant's actions (T. at 
105). Again, why appellant acted as he did was not 
before the Court. The jury's function was to determine 
that appellant was able to intend to act as he did. 
The mere fact that he had been drinking and was, in 
fact, intoxicated to the point that under the laws of 
this State he was driving unlawfully (T. at 42 and 44), 
does not establish a lack of ability to form the 
requisite criminal intent to commit aggravated robbery. 
There was ample evidence to support the jury's 
conclusion that appellant knew and intended the 
consequences of his act. The jury verdict must be 
affirmed. 
Several additional cases are instructive in 
this matter. In People v. Fisk, 62 Mich.App. 638, 233 
N.W. 2d 684 (1975), the defendant was convicted of armed 
robbery. Two psychiatrists testified that the defendant 
suffered from a sociopathic personality disorder and from 
alcoholic psychosis and that alcohol intake caused him to 
lose the willpower to resist the impulse to commit the 
-24-
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crime. The prosecution offered no expert witnesses in 
rebuttal. The court noted that "the prospect of sending 
a man who has obvious emotional problems to prison for 
twenty to forty years prompts this Court to examine 
carefully the findings of fact and conclusions of law." 
Id. at 686. The Court then stated: "The ultimate 
determination of sanity and the existence of specific 
intent rests with the trier of fact, whether court or 
jury." Id. at 686. The Court held that there was not 
sufficient evidence of reduced capacity to overturn the 
jury verdict of guilt and affirmed the verdict. 
In United States v. Williams, 332 F.Supp. 1 
(D. Maryland, 1971), the defendant was charged with 
robbing a bank. The evidence in the case indicated that 
the defendant had been drinking whiskey and had taken 
6 or 7 "yellow jackets" or barbiturate pills. He had 
also taken LSD pills. Witnesses said that he smelled 
strongly of liquor and had been drinking but did not seem 
drunk. His speech was heavy and he did not seem to 
walk normally. A psychiatrist testified that the 
defendant V.'as unable to control his actions when so 
intoxicated. Another psychiatric witness for the 
government testified that while the defendant could have 
controlled his actions if not intoxicated, defendant was 
a passive dependent type and had a condition something 
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short of total mental health. The Court cited Heideman 
v. United States, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 128, 259 F.2d 943 
at 946 (1958), wherein then Circuit Judge Burger stat~d: 
"Drunkenness, while efficient to reduce or remove 
inhibitions, does not readily negate intent." The 
Court in United States v. \villiarns then held: 
Id. at 7. 
.•. [T)hat the defendant had taken 
alcohol and drugs to the point of being 
"under the influence" but that he was not 
so intoxicated as not to understand what 
he was doing or to not have the intention 
to steal from the bank. There is a marked 
difference between the accounts of the 
persons who observed defendant and defendant's 
own account as to his condition. It appears 
from a witness called by the defense that he 
was able to write a "stickup" note shortly 
before the robbery, to go into the bank, hold 
a coherent conversation about a loan, present 
the note, obtain over $4,000 in cash, none of 
which has been returned, and make good his 
escape. The Court concludes beyond a reason-
able doubt that defendant had the intent to stea:1 
from the bank as required for conviction .•.. 
Finally, in People v. Bacon, 293 Ill. 210, 127 
N.E. 386 (1920), a retired policeman who was employed as a 
security guard was charged with the murder of a close frie~: 
The defendant had been wounded at one time with two bulle~' 
in the brain and, according to expert testimony, suffered 
intervals of unconsciousness during which he was not 
responsible for his actions. Apparently, he had encounte 
his friend in a bar where they had had a few beers. 
Suddenly, the defendant pulled his gun and shot the viet~ 
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for no reason. Upon being told later of his action 
the defendant said, "You are crazy; I did not shoot 
him; he was one of the best friends I had in the 
world; I would not hurt a hair on his head." The 
court held: 
While the circumstances surrounding 
this shooting are strange, and while it 
is difficult to account for the conduct 
of plaintiff in error, it is clear that 
there was in the record undisputed evidence 
which justified the verdict of the jury •. 
This court will not interfere with a verdict 
of guilty except when this court is able to 
say, from a careful consideration of the 
whole testimony, that there is clearly a 
reasonable and well-founded doubt of the 
guilt of the accused. 
Id. at 388. 
There is no question but that the circumstances 
in the instant matter are also strange. There was also 
evidence of intoxication~ Nevertheless, the jury listened 
to the witnesses and determined that appellant was not 
so intoxicated that he was unable to form the requisite 
criminal intent. Many crimes are senseless. Hopefully, 
one could say that anyone who specifically intends to 
commit a criminal act of violence is not "normal." Still, 
such persons are held responsible for their conduct. It 
is when they cannot intend the consequences of their 
conduct that they are not responsible for their actions. 
It would be a miscarriage of justice to reverse the 
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jury's determination of guilt because it is difficult to 
determine why appellant did what he did. The jury found 
that he intended to do what he did and that he was gui_lty 
of aggravated robbery as charged. That verdict is 
reasonable and should be upheld. / 
Finally, appellant argues that the jury finding 'I 
of not guilty of aggravated assault, a general intent crime, 
is inconsistent with an inference of ability to form the 
specific intent necessary for aggravated robbery (Appellant 
Brief at p. 38). Appellant's contention, however, rests 
upon several assumptions which are not supportable. First, 
he assumes that the jury found him not guilty of aggravated 
assault because they felt that appellant did not intend to! 
I 
assault Officer Vuksinik with his car. While that may 
be true, there is no way to determine that fact from the 
verdict of the jury. It is virtually impossible to tell 
why the jury determined that appellant was not guilty of 
aggravated assault. They may have felt that he was guilh 
of all the offenses but should only be punished for some 
of the offenses. 
A second assumption upon which appellant must 
rest his contention is that if the jury found appellant 
not guilty of aggravated assault because he had no intent 
to assault Officer Vuksinik, he lacked the intent becaus: 
-28-
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he lacked the capacity to form the intent. This is 
clearly not supportable. The jury may simply have 
believed that appellant did not intend to run into 
Officer Vuksinik with his car. Such an action would 
have ended any chance he had to escape. Perhaps the jury 
simply felt that an intent to assault Officer Vuksinik 
was inconsistent with his vigorous attempt to escape the 
pursuing police cars. Clearly, it need not be assumed 
that because the jury found appellant not guilty of 
aggravated assault, they could only have consistently 
returned a verdict of "not guilty" on the aggravated 
robbery charge as well. 
In summary, the verdict of the jury should only 
be discarded if the evidence compels a reasonable doubt as 
to the guilt of appellant. Evidence of intent may be 
inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case and 
testimony of an expert with respect to the lack of capacity 
to form intent need not be countered by additional expert 
testimony. Indeed, to apply such a rule in this case would 
be unjust since there was no notice of any intent to claim 
reduced capacity prior to the trial as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-22-16 (1953), as amended. There were 
sufficient facts in this matter to support the jury's 
conclusion that appellant was neither insane nor 
lntoxicated to the point of irresponsibility. The verdict 
of guilt should be affirmed. 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY. 
Appellant contends that the lower court erred ~ 
the instant matter in instructing the jury. He complains 
that the jury was improperly instructed with respect to the 
State's burden of proof on the question of intent and as 
to the weight to be given evidence of intoxication in 
determining the existence of the requisite intent 
(Appellant's Brief, Point II). Nevertheless, if all of 
the instructions are read together and placed in context, 
it is readily apparent that there was no error in the 
instructions given. 
It is well established that jury instructions 
should be considered as a whole and "not considered in 
isolation in order to predicate a claim or error." 
Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P.2d 575 at 577 
(1966). I See also State v. Coffey, 564 P. 2d 777 at 779 (~:' 
I 
1977), and State v. Dock, 585 P.2d 56 at 57 (Utah 1978). 
Taking all of the instructions together, it is 
clear that the jury in the instant matter was properly 
instructed on the State's burden of proof on the questior. 1 
of intent. Appellant was charged with the commission of 
three crimes: aggravated robbery, failure to stop a vet:.: 
at the command of a police officer, and aggravated assaui" 
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(R. at 17,18). In Instruction llwnber 2, the court told 
the jury that appellant's not guilty plea denied all of 
the essential allegations of the information and "casts 
upon the state the burden of proving each and all of the 
essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and 
beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. at 19). Each of the 
crimes charged was then explained. One of the material 
elements of aggravated robbery was: 
That the defendant on or about 
February 22, 1978 unlawfully and 
intentionally took personal property 
from the possession of Von W. Johnston. 
(R. at 20, emphasis added.) A material element of the 
charge of failure to stop a vehicle at the command of 
a police officer was: "That the defendant continued to 
operate his vehicle in willful or wanton di§reqard of such 
signal." (R. at 21, emphasis added.) No specific intent 
requirement was outlined for the crime of aggravated 
assault (R. at 22). In each of instructions 3, 4 and 5, 
outlining the material elements of the crimes charged, 
the jury was also told that: 
If. . the State has failed to prove 
to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable 
doubt either of the foregoing propositions 
. or if you entertain a reasonable doubt, 
then it is your duty to acquit the defendant. 
(R. at 20, 21 and 22). 
The jury was additionally instructed in 
Instruction Number 6 that: 
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No person is guilty of an offense 
unless his conduct is prohibited by law 
and he acts intentionally or knowingly 
with respect to each element of the 
offense as defined for you by these 
instructions. It does not require a 
specific intent to violate the law but 
merely an intent to engage in the acts 
or conduct that constitute the elements 
of the offense. 
Therefore, if you find that the 
mental conditions of the defendant at the 
times of the alleged offenses was such 
that he did not have the intent as that 
term has been defined for you in these 
instructions to perform the acts or conduct 
required for the commission of the offense 
charged, or if you entertain a reasonable 
doubt thereof, then you should find the 
defendant not guilty of the crimes charged. 
(R. at 23, emphasis added.) 
"Intentionally" was defined in Instruction 
Number 7 as when an actor has a "conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result" 
(R. at 24). "Willful," although not defined in the 
instructions is a word commonly understood and is defined 
as intentional. See Webster's New International 
Dictionary, 2d Ed., Unabridged. See also Brunson v. 
Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 and 452-453 (1966), 
where this Court noted that jury instructions "should be 
read in their entire context and given meaning in accorda~ 
with the ordinary and usual import of the language. . · ·" 
Although appellant contends that Instruction Nur:/ 
6 misstates the law, he is mistaken (see Appellant's Bne:f 
p. 48). As the specific intent crimes are stated in the 
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Utah Code and as they were explained to the jury, the 
"specific intent" required is clearly nothing more than 
that appellant consciously intended the result of his 
actions. See LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, 
1972, at 196. In the case of aggravated robbery, appellant 
must have wanted or consciously desired to "take personal 
property in the possession of another . . by means of 
force or fear" (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as 
amended) . For failure to stop a vehicle at the command 
of a police officer appellant must have consciously ignored 
a signal or command from a police officer to stop his 
vehicle (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169.10 1 repealed 1978). 
Instruction Number 6 is correct when it states that 
appellant had the necessary intent if he had the "intent 
to engage in the acts or conduct that constitutes the 
elements of the offense." 
Clearly, in the instant matter, the jury was 
instructed that the state had the burden to prove, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the specific intent required for the 
crimes of aggravated robbery and failure to stop a vehicle 
at the command of a police officer. As appellant notes, 
no specific intent is required to establish the crime of 
aggravated assault (Appellant's Brief at p. 38). Moreover, 
they were told that if they had a reasonable doubt of 
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appellant's mental ability to possess the required intent 
then they were to find appellant not guilty. 
Appellant also questions the instruction on 
voluntary intoxication, Instruction Number 8. That 
instruction provided: 
Our law provides that "no act committed 
by a person while in a state of voluntary 
intoxication is less criminal by reason of 
his having been in such condition." This 
means that such a condition, if shown by the 
evidence to have existed in the defendant at 
the time when allegedly he committed the 
crime charged, is not of itself a defense. 
It may throw light on the occurrence and 
aid you in determining what took place; but 
when a person in a state of intoxication, 
voluntarily produced in himself, commits a 
crime, the law does not permit him to use his 
own vice as a shelter against the normal, 
legal consequences of his conduct. 
However, when the existence of any 
particular motive, purpose or intent is a 
necessary element to constitute a particular 
kind or degree of crime the jury, in 
determining whether or not such motive, purpose 
or intent existed in the mind of the accused, 
must take into consideration the evidence 
offered to prove that the accused was 
~ntoxicated at the time when the crime 
allegedly was committed. 
This fact requires an inquiry into the 
state of mind under which the defendant 
committed the act charged, if he did commit 
it. In pursing that inquiry, it is proper to 
consider whether he was intoxicated at the t~e 
of the alleged offense. The weight to be giv~ 
on Lhat question and the significance to attach 
to it, in relation to all the other evidence, arE 
exclusively within your province. 
(R. at 25, emphasis added.) 
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In evaluating Instruction Number 8, it is 
important to remember that, although appellant \vas 
convicted of two specific intent crimes, he was 
charged with three crimes, one of which did not 
have a particular state of mind as a material element. 
It is clear, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1953), 
as amended, that "(vpluntary intoxication is no defense 
to a criminal charge." In the normal situation, where 
no specific intent need be established as a material 
element of the crime charged, evidence of voluntary 
intoxication is irrelevant and should be disregarded. 
When, however, the State is bound to establish that a 
particular mental state existed, evidence of voluntary 
intoxication becomes relevant but only as it pertains 
to the presence of the requisite mental state. Proof of 
intoxication, of whatever degree, does not mandate a 
finding of no intent and not guilty. Voluntary 
intoxication is never an absolute defense in the sense 
that establishment of voluntary intoxication precludes 
guilt. Such evidence must be weighed, along with all 
other evidence to determine if the material intent 
el~ent was established. Only if the intoxication was 
of such a degree or nature that the defendant was precluded 
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Instruction Number 8 correctly stated the 
law. Where both crimes requiring proof of a particular 
intent and crimes not requiring such proof are charged, 
the court must instruct as to the effect and weight to 
be given evidence of voluntary intoxication in both 
situations. By giving both explanations together in 
one instruction, the court makes it clear that there is 
a difference and that one situation is an exception. 
There is much greater potential for confusion where 
one instruction explains the law for specific intent 
crimes and another gives the general rule. The court 
had already made clear the material eleQents of the 
crimes charged, including the fact that a particular 
intent was material to two of the three. There was no 
need for further reference to those particular mental 
states and, indeed, such a reference may have unduly 
emphasized appellant's case. Instruction Number 8 
correctly stated the law and was not error. 
Although it is true, as noted by appellant, 
that instructions framed within the facts of the case 
are helpful to the jury and better than abstract 
explanations of the law in most cases, the court did 
not err in this matter. Each of the crimes charged 
was explained carefully and concretely within the facts 
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already been noted, the relevance of voluntary 
intoxication to each crime differed. A general 
description of the law of voluntary intoxication,· 
easily applicable to each of the other, more concrete 
explanations,was proper and less confusing than 
separate, differing explanations would have been. 
The gist of appellant's claim seems to be 
that the court did not emphasize his theory of reduced 
intent due to the combined effects of alcohol, medication, 
and brain disorder. There was no need for the court to 
summarize appellant's defense in the instructions. There 
was never any contention that appellant would have done 
what he did without having ingested, voluntarily, alcohol 
and medication. The jury was told to consider evidence 
of intoxication in determining the presense of the 
requisite mental intent. There was no indication that 
appellant had taken any unusual medication or had 
anything to drink which he had not had with his medication 
before. Rather, the evidence indicated that he was 
drinking what he always drank and that he had been 
taking medication daily for some time (T. at 69-70, 
78-79). It certainly is not the law that one who 
becomes more intoxicated than he wanted to through voluntary 
ingestion of drugs or alcohol has a defense on that basis. 
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Appellant's proposed instructions on involuntary 
intoxication were not supported by the evidence. What 
there was to appellant's defense was covered by the 
instructions on mental capacity and voluntary intoxica-
tion. Significantly, these instructions placed at least 
as great a burden upon the State, if not greater than would 
appellant's proposed Instruction Number 4 where appellant 
noted that: 
Should you find that defendant 
was under involuntary intoxication to the 
extent that there was no functioning of 
the conscious mind at the time of the 
alleged criminal acts, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
If the jury had found appellant to be so intoxicated 
for any reason as to have no functioning of the conscious 
mind they would have been bound to find appellant not 
guilty of aggravated robbery and failure to stop at the 
command of a police officer under Instruction Numbers 
3, 4, 6 and 7. 
In summary, the necessity of proof of intent 
and consideration of evidence indicating a lack of 
capacity to prove such an intent were both properly 
presented to the jury. The elements of the offenses 
charged were concretely presented with reference to the 
facts of the case and the jury was specifically told that 
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the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that appellant acted intentionally in committing the 
acts constituting the crimes of aggravated robbery ano 
failure to stop at the command of a police officer. 
Appellant's theory was adequately presented through the 
instructions on reduced capacity, requisite intent, and 
voluntary intoxication. The court did not err and the 
jury verdict should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE VERDICT OF GUILT ON THE CHARGE 
OF FAILURE TO STOP A VEHICLE AT THE 
COMMAND OF A POLICE OFFICER IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
While it is true that an element of the crime 
for failure to stop a vehicle at the command of a police 
officer, as stated in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169.10, as 
repealed 1978, is that the actor acted "wilfully" or 
intentionally, that element was fully and completely 
explained to the jury (see Point II, supra), and there was 
ample evidence from which they could infer that essential 
element (see Point I, supra). Neither was appellant's 
evidence of reduced capacity so overwhelming or compelling 
as to mandate a not guilty verdict. As was explained more 
completely in Point I, specific intent may be inferred 
from the acts and conduct of the accused. State v. Minousis, 
supra, and other cases as cited in Point I. In the instant 
matter, the evidence clearly indicates that appellant was 
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lucid and in control of his faculties at all times 
during the night in question. He walked and talked 
normally (T. at 12,13,16,19,20,37,53, and 60). He 
recognized Officer Vuksinik as an acquaintance (T. at 
54 and 59). Appellant was in full control of his 
car during an extended high speed chase (T. at 33-34,46, 
49 and 55) during which it appeared as if he fired a 
weapon at the pursuing officers (T. at 49). 
It is clear that although once a defendant rais91 
the question of insanity any presumption of insanity 
disappears, the question of the defendant's ability to 
form the requisite intent then becomes a jury question. 
Horeover, ~he issue of voluntary intoxication as a 
defense is also primarily a jury issue since the question 
is not whether or not intoxication existed but whether or 
not the intoxication, if it existed, acted to negate the 
defendant's ability to form the requisite intent. (See 
Points I and II for extended discussion of these issues.) 
In this matter there was enough evidence to support the 
reasonable view that appellant knew what he was doing whee 
he robbed the Johnstons and led the police on a dangerous, 
high speed chase. The verdict of the jury should only be 
overturned when a reasonable doubt is compelled (see ~ 
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v. Hills, supra) which is not the case here. The testimony 
of the psychiatrist was tentative at best. The weight 
to be given the testimony of experts, even when uncontradicted 
by additional expert testimony, is for the jury (see State 
v. Holt, supra). The verdict of the jury was proper and 
should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
REVOCATION OF APPELLNiT'S PROBATION 
\'lAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
When appellant was placed on probation following 
conviction, he was directed to "submit to a breahalyzer 
test at the discretion of the Adult Probation and Parole 
Departr.lent within reasonable circumstances and hours;" 
and to "totally abstain from the use of alcohol beverages" 
(R. at 85). Horeover, he agreed to "be of good behavior" 
(R. at 87). The Court revoked his probation on the ground 
that appellant had acted violently toward his probation 
officer and had refused a reasonable request to take a 
breathalyzer test (R. at 83, H. at 66). 
The Court's conclusions were supported by the 
evidence introduced at the Show Cause for Revocation Hearing 
on Hay 23, 1979. Police officers received a report that a 
barefoot woman in pajamas and nightgown was beating on a 
door around midnight screaming that someone was trying to 
kill her (H. at 28-29). She told the officers that she 
lived with appel~ant and that he had been drinking, 
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threatened her, and had thrown her out of the house (H. 
at 29). She expressed a desire to retrieve her property 
from appellant's house (H. at 29 and 47). 
The officers knocked on the door of appellant's 
house and got no response (H. at 30). The young woman 
then opened the door and led the officers to appellant's 
room (H. at 5,6,13, and 30). Appellant's probation super-
visor, Agent Reid, knocked on the locked bedroom door 
and identified himself while politely asking to talk 
(H. at 6,30,41 and 48). Without warning, appellant 
opened his bedroom door and grabbed Agent Reid. Appellant 
was restrained by Sheriff's Deputy Christensen but 
not before he tore Agent Reid's shirt (H. at 6,30,42 and 4~~ 
Deputy Christensen noted a strong odor of alcohol about / 
appellant (H. at SO). Faced with a report of drinking and 1 
violence and the fact of appellant's violent reaction and I 
I 
hysterical behavior (H. at 43), Agent Reid requested that 
appellant submit to a breathalyzer test. Appellant 
refused to take the test (H. at 8,9,31 and 50). Appellant 
admitted the struggle with Agent Reid (H. at 53) and 
remembered the request to take a breathalyzer test (H. c. 
53). He also noted that the woman had clothes in his 
room in a drawer which he eventually threw into the 
living room (H. at 54). 
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The evidence clearly indicates that appellant 
engaged in violent behavior with respect to Agent Reid. 
His refusal to take a breathalyzer test was also shown by 
uncontradicted evidence. Appellant does not now contend 
that these matters were shown. Nor does he contend that 
the terms of his probation were unreasonable. Rather, 
he argues that the actions of the officers in entering 
his horne and requesting a breathalyzer exam were 
improper and unreasonable (Appellant's Brief at 54-57). 
He further argues that the lower court acted unreasonably 
in revoking his probation on those grounds (Appellant's 
Brief at 64-65). 
It is well settled that revocation of probation 
is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. 
In Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 at 642 
(1944), this Court noted: 
The right to suspend imposition of 
sentence and the right to place one on 
probation is a discretionary right. One 
placed upon probation has a right to be 
heard as to whether he has violated the 
conditions upon which suspended sentence 
was based. . Upon such a hearing, 
the trial court has discretionary power to 
continue probation or impose sentence, but 
to authorize termination of probation there 
must be some competent evidence of violation 
of the terms of probation. Violation of the 
terms and conditions of suspension or probation 
is usually a ground for revocation and the 
imposition of sentence. . When it appears 
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that a trial judge has exercised 
discretion in suspending imposition of 
sentence or in revoking probation and 
imposing sentence, after a hearing as 
heretofore mentioned, the judgment of 
the trial court should not be molested. 
(Emphasis added.) 
See also State v. Janis, 597 P.2d 873 at 874 (1979), and 1 
State v. Knowles, 25 Utah 2d 13, 474 P.2d 727 at 728 (1970): 
The standard of proof in a revocation hearing 1 
is also much lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard employed in criminal trials. 
A revocation of probation is an 
exercise of broad discretionary power by the 
trial court akin to that utilized in imposing 
the probated sentence initially. Evidence 
that would establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt is not required to support an order revokinc 
probation. Probably evidence rising to the level I 
of substantial evidence is not even required, 1 
absent arbitrary and capricious action in the I 
revocation. All that is required is that the · 
evidence and facts be such as to reasonably 
satisfy the judge that the conduct of the 
probationer has not been as good as required 
by the conditions of probation .•. On review 
an action of the trial court revoking probation 
will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear 
showing of abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827 at 829 (5th 
Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 604r 
606 (8th Cir. 1978); Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 312 
So. 2d 620 at 624 (1975); and People v. 1\Titherspoon, 9 Ill. 
App.3d 317, 292 N.E.2d 202 at 203 to 204 (1972). 
The evidence in this instance showed at least 
two violations of probation without contradiction. The 
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evidence indicated that the.request for a breathalyzer 
test was entirely reasonable. The officers had a report 
of drinking and violence and had been directly confronted 
by appellant's further aggressive, violent behavior. He 
smelled of alcohol. He had the clothing of the pajama-
clad woman who complained of his earlier, violent behavior. 
The testimony of four officers agreed that appellant 
reacted violently to a polite, non-beligerant request to 
talk. The Court's conclusion that appellant violated his 
probation by acting violently and refusing a reasonable 
request to submit to a breathalyzer test finds clear 
support in the evidence. There is absolutely no showing 
of any abuse of discretion and the action of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
POINT V 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION DOES NOT 
REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF 
THE LO\'i'ER COURT TO REVOKE APPELLANT' S 
PROBATION. 
Appellant contends that the evidence upon 
which his probation was revoked was obtained in violation 
of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and should not have been 
considered by the lower court (Appellant's Brief at p. 58). 
The United States Supreme Court has held: 
-45-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The test of reasonableness under 
the Fourth Amendment is not capable of 
precise definition or mechanical applica-
tion. In each case it requires a balancing 
of the need for the particular search against 
the inasion of personal rights that the 
search entials. Courts must consider the 
scope of the particular intrusion, the manner 
in which it is conducted, the justificiation 
for initiating it and the place in which it 
is conducted. 
Bell v. Wolfish, 99 s.ct. 1861 at 1884 (1979). See also 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 98 s.ct. 330 at 332 (1977); ~ 
v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 at 121 (Utah 1976); and State v. 
White, 577 P.2d 552 at 553 (Utah 1978). 
The "search" in the instant matter was something 
less than a full-blown room by room examination of appellan::! 
horne. The officers merely accompanied a woman, clad in 
night clothes, into a house she claimed to live in to 
question appellant (H. at 5,6,13 and 30). lvhen confronted 
with appellant's locked bedroom door they stopped and 
requested appellant to come out and talk (H. at 6,30,41 and 
1 
48). Although the officers testified as to what they saw 
in the house, it was clear that the purpose for entering 
the house was to confront appellant, retrieve the woman's 
property, and to determine if, in fact, appellant had 
violated the terms of his probation. The lower court clea: 
based its conclusion that probation had been violated on ~ 
actions of appellant in the presence of the officers, no~ 
upon any evidence obtained as the result of an illegal 
search (H. at 64-66). 
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Appellant notes that Fourth Amendment require-
ments where probationers are involved are different 
than for the ordinary citizen (Appellant's Brief at 
p. 54). In Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 
1975), the Court compared the privacy interests of a 
parolee and the interests and needs of society in seeing 
that conditions of parole are met and concluded that it was 
not appropriate to require a parole officer to obtain a 
warrant (Id. at 250). The Court stated: 
We think that one. . . (restriction) 
. necessary to the effective operation 
of the parole system, is that the parolee 
and his home are subject to search by the 
parole officer when the officer reasonably 
believes that such search is necessary in 
the perfon.1ance of his duties. The parole 
officer ought to know more about the 
parolee than anyone else but his family. 
He is therefore in a better position 
than anyone else to decide whether a 
search is necessary. His decision may 
be based upon specific facts, though 
they be less than sufficient to sustain 
a finding of probable cause. It may even 
be based on a "hunch," arising from 
what he has learned or observed about the 
behavior and attitude of the parolee. To 
grant such powers to the parole officer is 
not, in our view, unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. The principal protection 
against abuse of this authority is the 
"helping" function of the parole officer's 
job, and the training that he has received 
to fit him for that job. A good parole 
officer does not regard himself as a 
policeman. 
Id. at 250. 
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In United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074 
(9th Cir. 1978), the same Court noted that a blanket 
requirement to submit to warrantless searches was an 
overbroad condition of probation but held that "since 
the probation officer had reason to believe that 
appellant was violating his probation, this search 
which took place at a reasonable time and in a reason-
able manner was proper." Id. at 1075. 
In Hunter v. State, 139 Ga.App. 676, 229 
S.E.2d 505 (1976), the court expressed what appears to 
be the majority view with respect to a determination of 
what searches are reasonable when conducted by probation 
officers: 
The search by a probation officer 
is reasonable if under all the circumstances, 
it is actuated by the legitimate operation 
of the probation supervision process and the 
probation officer acts reasonably in performing 
those cluties. 
Id. at 506. See also Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905 at 90' 
(Fla. 1979); Seirn v. State, 590 P. 2d 1152 at 1154 to 1155 
(Nev. 1979); State v. Jeffers, 116 Ariz. 192, 568 P.2d 
1090 at 1093 (1977) (condition of probation upheld here Vl2' 
held overbroad in Unitec:i States v. Jeffers, supra, but the 
specific warrantless search involved was approved in both 
opinions and revocation of probation was affirmed); and 
United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 at 162 (6th Cir. 19-
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In this case, irrespective of whether probable 
cause for an arrest or search existed, and irrespective 
of whether proper consent was given for entry into the 
house, Agent Reid was acting within the scope of his 
duties when he sought to confront appellant and determine 
if he had violated the terms of his probation. There was 
no abusive or violent action by any of the officers. Had 
Agent Reid waited until morning to confront appellant, 
any indication that he had been or was consuming alcohol 
might have disappeared. Moreover, it was entirely 
reasonable to accompany the young woman in an attempt to 
retrieve her property. Given appellant's probationary 
status, there was no Fourth Amendment violation and 
revocation of appellant's probation was appropriate. 
Even if it is assumed, but not admitted, that 
Agent Reid could not enter appellant's home without a 
warrant or proper consent, the revocation of probation 
in this matter should be affirmed. As stated above, the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. 
State v. Lopes, supra. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 
at 332, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The touchstone of our analysis under 
the fourth amendment is always "the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of 
the particular governmental invasion of a 
citizen's personal security. " 
The officers in this case had clear and obvious 
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indications that the complaining woman lived at that 
time in appellant's house. She told them so (H. at 29). 
She had only night clothes on and the rest of her cloth~g 
was said to be in appellant's bedroom (H. at 29). The 
officers had no reason to disbelieve her story or suspect 
her right to consent to their entry. Again it should be 
borne in mind that no extensive search or arrest was 
undertaken on the authority of her statement. All the 
officers did was to enter the house and ask to speak to 
appellant. His violent response and subsequent refusal 
to submit to a breathalyzer exam caused his probation to 
be revoked. This limited invasion of ·appellant's privacy 
at the consent of a woman who was sharing his roof, 
however temporarily, was proper and reasonable. 
Nevertheless, even if it is also assumed, but 
not admitted, that the officers improperly entered 
appellant's home, the revocation of appellant's probation 
should still be affirmed. It is generally held that 
although the Fourth Amendment has some limited application 
to probationers, application of the strict exclusionary ri 
in probation revocation hearings does not serve the purpo~ 
of that rule. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 
94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), the Court noted: 
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The purpose of the exclusionary 
rule is not to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the search victim: 
"[T]he ruptured privacy of 
the victim's homes and effects 
cannot be restored. Reparation 
comes too late." Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637, 85 
s.ct. 1731, 1742, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 
(1965). 
Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to 
deter future unlawful police conduct and 
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the 
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
94 S.Ct. at 619-620. 
In United States v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577 at 
578 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court said that "[t]he exclusionary 
rule does not apply to probation revocation hearings absent 
a demonstration of police harassment of probationers." 
See also United States v. Fredrickson, 581 F.2d 711 at 713 
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Farmer, supra; United States 
v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019 at 1020 (9th Cir. 1975); and 
United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 at 55 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Clearly, the mere consideration of tainted evidence 
in a probation revocation hearing does not require 
reversal of a decision to revoke probation. The damning 
evidence in this case was the personally observed violence 
of appellant and the refusal to submit to a breathalyzer 
test (H. at 64-66). Officers testified that beer was in 
the refrigerator and that empty beer cans were in the 
house (H. at 34), but the Court did not include that 
evidence in its summary of the evidence supporting the 
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finding.of probation violation (H. at 64-66). Even though 
the officers may not have completed the necessary formalitL 
to properly enter the house, appellant's violent reaction 
to a request to talk and his refusal to submit to the 
reasonable request for a breathalyzer exam were unjustified.! 
The officers did not threaten, or harass appellant and his 
actions in violation of his probation requirements could 
not be overlooked even if the officers had failed to conforr' 
to all the technicalities of the law. 
In summary, the entry of the officers into 
appellant's home was reasonable and not in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable 
searches. The action was taken as a legitimate exercise 
of a probation officers' powers necessary to the adequate 
performance of his duties. The request for submission to 
a breathalyzer exam was entirely reasonable in light of 
appellant's conduct. Even if Agent Reid had no authority 
on his own to enter the house, it was reasonable for the 
officers to act in reliance upon the woman's representati~ 
that she lived in the house and could allow them to enter. 
Moreover, even if she had no such authority and the office 
should not have entered the house without a warrant, the 
strict exclusionary rule should not be applied in the 
probation revocation setting and the fact of appellant's 
violent behavior and unreasonable refusal to take a 
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breathalyzer exam could not have been overlooked by the 
trial court. The revocation of probation was proper 
and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence of appellant's reduced capacity 
due to insanity and/or intoxication was not so 
overwhelming as to require the jury's determination of 
guilt to be overturned. Specific intent may be inferred 
from circumstantial evidence. It cannot be said that 
the jury, without doubt, acted unreasonably since they 
were properly instructed as to the required proof of 
intent and the potential defenses of reduced capacity 
and intoxication. 
The lower court's exercise of discretion in 
revoking appellant's probation was also supported by 
the evidence. There is no indication of any abuse of 
discretion. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment was not violated 
by the entry into appellant's horne without a warrant. It 
was reasonable for the officers to have relied upon the 
apparant authority of the complainant. In any event, 
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The conviction, sentence, and commitment of 
appellant should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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